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Abstract
We introduce a Noise-based prior Learning (NoL)
approach for training neural networks that are
intrinsically robust to adversarial attacks. We
find that the implicit generative modeling of ran-
dom noise with the same loss function used dur-
ing posterior maximization, improves a model’s
understanding of the data manifold furthering
adversarial robustness. We evaluate our ap-
proach’s efficacy and provide a simplistic visu-
alization tool for understanding adversarial data,
using Principal Component Analysis. Our anal-
ysis reveals that adversarial robustness, in gen-
eral, manifests in models with higher variance
along the high-ranked principal components. We
show that models learnt with our approach per-
form remarkably well against a wide-range of
attacks. Furthermore, combining NoL with state-
of-the-art adversarial training extends the robust-
ness of a model, even beyond what it is ad-
versarially trained for, in both white-box and
black-box attacks. Source Code available at
panda1230/Adversarial NoiseLearning NoL.
1. Introduction
Despite surpassing human performance on several percep-
tion tasks, Machine Learning (ML) models remain vulnera-
ble to adversarial examples: slightly perturbed inputs that
are specifically designed to fool a model during test time
(Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Papernot et al., 2016a). Recent works have demon-
strated the security danger adversarial attacks pose across
several platforms with ML backend such as computer vision
(Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Moosavi Dez-
fooli et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016),
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malware detectors (Laskov et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2016;
Grosse et al., 2016; Hu & Tan, 2017) and gaming environ-
ments (Huang et al., 2017; Behzadan & Munir, 2017). Even
worse, adversarial inputs transfer across models: same in-
puts are misclassified by different models trained for the
same task, thus enabling simple Black-Box (BB) 1attacks
against deployed ML systems (Papernot et al., 2017).
Several works (Krotov & Hopfield, 2017; Papernot et al.,
2016b; Cisse et al., 2017) demonstrating improved adver-
sarial robustness have been shown to fail against stronger
attacks (Athalye et al., 2018). The state-of-the-art approach
for BB defense is ensemble adversarial training that aug-
ments the training dataset of the target model with adver-
sarial examples transferred from other pre-trained models
(Trame`r et al., 2017a). (Madry et al., 2017) showed that
models can even be made robust to White-Box (WB)1 at-
tacks by closely maximizing the model’s loss with Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) based adversarial training. Despite
this progress, errors still appear for perturbations beyond
what the model is adversarially trained for (Sharma & Chen,
2017).
There have been several hypotheses explaining the suscep-
tibility of ML models to such attacks. The most common
one suggests that the overly linear behavior of deep neural
models in a high dimensional input space causes adversar-
ial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Lou et al., 2016).
Another hypothesis suggests that adversarial examples are
off the data manifold (Goodfellow et al., 2016; Song et al.,
2017; Lee et al., 2017). Combining the two, we infer that
excessive linearity causes models to extrapolate their behav-
ior beyond the data manifold yielding pathological results
for slightly perturbed inputs. A question worth asking here
is: Can we improve the viability of the model to generalize
better on such out-of-sample data?
In this paper, we propose Noise-based Prior Learning (NoL),
wherein we introduce multiplicative noise into the training
inputs and optimize it with Stochastic Gradient Descent
(SGD) while minimizing the overall cost function over the
training data. Essentially, the input noise (randomly initial-
ized at the beginning) is gradually learnt during the training
1BB (WB): attacker has no (full) knowledge of the target model
parameters
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
02
18
8v
4 
 [c
s.L
G]
  3
1 M
ay
 20
19
Modeling of Random Noise during Training improves Adversarial Robustness
procedure. As a result, the noise approximately models
the input distribution to effectively maximize the likelihood
of the class labels given the inputs. Fig. 1 (a) shows the
input noise learnt during different stages of training by a
simple convolutional network (ConvNet2 architecture dis-
cussed in Section 3 below), learning handwritten digits from
MNIST dataset (LeCun et al., 1998). We observe that the
noise gradually transforms and finally assumes a shape that
highlights the most dominant features in the MNIST train-
ing data. For instance, the MNIST images are centered
digits on a black background. Noise, in fact, learnt this
centered characteristic. Fig. 1 suggests that noise discovers
some knowledge about the input/output distribution during
training. Fig. 1 (b) shows the noise learnt with NoL on
colored CIFAR10 images (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) (on
ResNet18 architecture (He et al., 2016)), which reveals that
noise template (also RGB) learns prominent color blobs on a
greyish-black background, that de-emphasizes background
pixels.
A recent theory (Gilmer et al., 2018) suggests that adver-
sarial examples (off manifold misclassified points) occur
in close proximity to randomly chosen inputs on the data
manifold that are, in fact, correctly classified. With NoL, we
hypothesize that the model learns to look in the vicinity of
the on-manifold data points and thereby incorporate more
out-of-sample data (without using any direct data augmen-
tation) that, in turn, improves its generalization capability
in the off-manifold input space. We empirically evaluate
this hypothesis by visualizing and studying the relationship
between the adversarial and the clean inputs using Principal
Component Analysis (PCA). Examining the intermediate
layer’s output, we discover that models exhibiting adver-
sarial robustness yield significantly lower distance between
adversarial and clean inputs in the Principal Component
(PC) subspace.We further harness this result to establish
that NoL noise modeling, indeed, acquires an improved
realization of the input/output distribution characteristics
that enables it to generalize better. To further substantiate
our hypothesis, we also show that NoL globally reduces the
dimensionality of the space of adversarial examples (Trame`r
et al., 2017b). We evaluate our approach on classification
tasks such as MNIST, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 and show
that models trained with NoL are extensively more adver-
sarially robust. We also show that combining NoL with
ensemble/PGD adversarial training significantly extends the
robustness of a model, even beyond what it is adversarially
trained for, in both BB/WB attack scenarios.
2. Noise-based Prior Learning
2.1. Approach
The basic idea of NoL is to inject random noise with the
training data, continually minimizing the overall loss func-
tion by learning the parameters, as well as the noise at every
step of training. The noise, N , dimensionality is same as
the input, X , that is, for a 32×32×3 sized image, the noise
is 32× 32× 3. In all our experiments, we use mini-batch
SGD optimization. Let’s assume the size of the training
minibatch is m and the number of images in the minibatch
is k, then, total training images are m× k. Now, the total
number of noisy templates are equal to the total number of
inputs in each minibatch, k. Since, we want to learn the
noise, we use the same k noise templates across all mini-
batches 1, 2, ...,m. This ensures that the noise templates
inherit characteristics from the entire training dataset. Al-
gorithm 1 shows the training procedure. It is evident from
Algorithm 1 that noise learning at every training step follows
the overall loss (L, say cross-entropy) minimization that in
turn enforces the maximum likelihood of the posterior.
Algorithm 1 Noise-based Prior Learning of a model f with
parameters θ, Loss Function L.
Input: Input image X , Target label Y , Noise N , Learning
rates η, ηnoise
Output: Learnt noise N and parameters θ.
Randomly initialize the parameters θ and Noise N :
{N1, ...Nk}.
repeat
for each minibatch {X [1], ..., X [m]}
Input X= {X1, ..., Xk}
New input X= {X1 ×N1, ..., Xk ×Nk}
Forward Propagation: Yˆ = f(X; θ)
Compute loss function: L(Yˆ , Y )
Backward Propagation:
θ = θ - η∇θL; N = N - ηnoise∇NL
end
until training converges
Since adversarial attacks are created by adding perturbation
to the clean input images, we were initially inclined toward
using additive noise (X+N ) instead of multiplicative noise
(X×N ) to perform NoL. However, we found that NoL train-
ing withX×N tends to learn improved noise characteristics
by the end of training. Fig. 2 (a) shows the performance
results for different NoL training scenarios. While NoL with
X +N suffers a drastic ∼ 10% accuracy loss with respect
to standard SGD on clean data, X ×N yields comparable
accuracy. Furthermore, we observe that using only negative
gradients for training the noise (i.e. ∇NL ≤ 0) during back-
propagation with NoL yields best accuracy (and closer to
that of standard SGD trained model). Visualizing a sample
image with learnt noise after training, in Fig. 2 (b), shows
X +N disturbs the original image severely, while X ×N
has a faint effect, corroborating the accuracy results. Since
noise is modeled while conducting discriminative training,
the multiplicative/additive nature of noise influences the
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Increasing training epochs
Initial Epoch1 Epoch7 Final(a) (b) Initial Final
Figure 1. (a) Noise learnt with NoL on MNIST data- (b) Noise learnt with NoL on CIFAR10 data- with mini-batch size =64.The template
shown is the mean across all 64 noise templates.
overall optimization. Thus, we observe that noise templates
learnt with X ×N and X +N are very different. We also
analyzed the adversarial robustness of the models when
subjected to WB attacks created using the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) for different perturbation levels ()
(Fig. 2 (a)). NoL, for both X ×N /X +N scenarios, yields
improved accuracy than standard SGD. This establishes the
effectiveness of the noise modeling technique during dis-
criminative training towards improving a model’s intrinsic
adversarial resistance. Still, X × N yields slightly better
resistance than X +N . Based upon these empirical studies,
we chose to conform to multiplicative noise training in this
paper. 2 Note, WB attacks, in case of NoL, are crafted using
the model’s parameters as well as the learnt noise N .
In all our experiments, we initialize the noise N from a
random uniform distribution in the range [0.8, 1]. We select
a high range in the beginning of training to limit the cor-
ruption induced on the training data due to the additional
noise. During evaluation/testing, we take the mean of the
learnt noise across all the templates ((
∑k
i=1Ni)/k), multi-
ply the averaged noise with each test image and feed it to
the network to obtain the final prediction. Next, we present
a general optimization perspective considering the maxi-
mum likelihood criterion for a classification task to explain
adversarial robustness. It is worth mentioning that while
Algorithm 1 describes the backpropagation step simply by
using gradient updates, we can use other techniques like
regularization, momentum etc. for improved optimization.
It is noteworthy to reiterate that in our NoL approach, we
introduce a random set of noise templates (say, K noise
templates) to the training data (say, M number of total train-
ing instances in the dataset), where, K << M . Here, as
we learn the noise templates (N : {N1, ...NK}) over the
duration of training, the noise templates (randomly initial-
ized at the beginning of training) begin to model the input
2Additional studies on other datasets comparing X + N vs.
X ×N with different gradient update conditions can be found in
Appendix A. See, experimental details and model description for
Fig. 2 in Appendix C.1.
distribution (as seen from Fig. 1). The fact that the same set
of noise templates are introduced batch-wise (when training
with mini-batch gradient descent) with the training data,
enables the prior modeling property. Thus, in Fig. 1, we
see the evolution of the noise templates from random dis-
tribution in the initial epoch to some shape (characteristic
of input data) in the final epoch (as they are learnt with
backpropagation N := N − ∇NL). NoL is in contrast
to previous works (Noh et al., 2017; Fawzi et al., 2016;
Hinton), wherein, random noise is injected to the training
dataset, which can be viewed as having same number of
noise templates as the number of training instances, that
is, K = M . Here, the noise templates are simply used
to perturb the training data to impose some regularization
effect during training. These noise templates are ‘not learnt’
unlike NoL. In such cases, each batch (when training with
mini-batch gradient descent) of training data sees a different
set of random noise templates drawn from a given distri-
bution. Referring to Fig 1, with random noise injection as
(Noh et al., 2017; Fawzi et al., 2016; Hinton), we will see
that the noise template remains random as shown in the
initial epoch throughout the training process till the final
epoch.
2.2. Adversarial Robustness from Likelihood
Perspective
Given a data distribution D with inputs X ∈ Rd and corre-
sponding labels Y , a classification/discriminative algorithm
models the conditional distribution p(Y |X; θ) by learning
the parameters θ. Since X inherits only the on-manifold
data points, a standard model thereby becomes susceptible
to adversarial attacks. For adversarial robustness, inclusion
of the off-manifold data points while modeling the condi-
tional probability is imperative. An adversarially robust
model should, thus, model p(Y |X,A; θ), where A repre-
sents the adversarial inputs. Using Bayes rule, we can de-
rive the prediction obtained from posterior modeling from a
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generative standpoint as:
argmax
Y
p(Y |X,A) = argmax
Y
p(A|X,Y )p(X,Y )
p(X,A)
(1)
= argmax
Y
p(A|X,Y )p(X|Y )p(Y )
(2)
The methods employing adversarial training (Trame`r et al.,
2017a; Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2017) directly
follow the left-hand side of Eqn. 2 wherein the training
data is augmented with adversarial samples (A ∈ A). Such
methods showcase adversarial robustness against a partic-
ular form of adversary (e.g. `∞-norm bounded) and hence
remain vulnerable to stronger attack scenarios. In an ideal
case, A must encompass all set of adversarial examples (or
the entire space of off-manifold data) for a concrete guar-
antee of robustness. However, it is infeasible to anticipate
all forms of adversarial attacks during training. From a gen-
erative viewpoint (right-hand side of Eqn. 2), adversarial
robustness requires modeling of the adversarial distribution
while realizing the joint input/output distribution characteris-
tics (p(X|Y ), p(Y )). Yet, it remains a difficult engineering
challenge to create rich generative models that can capture
these distributions accurately. Some recent works lever-
aging a generative model for robustness use a PixelCNN
model (Song et al., 2017) to detect adversarial examples, or
use Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to generate
adversarial examples (Samangouei et al., 2018). But, one
might come across practical difficulties while implementing
such methods due to the inherent training difficulty.
With Noise-based Prior Learning, we partially address
the above difficulty by modeling the noise based on
the prediction loss of the posterior distribution. First,
let us assume that the noise (N) introduced with NoL
spans a subspace of potential adversarial examples (N ⊆
A). Based on Eqn. 2 the posterior optimization cri-
terion with noise (N) becomes argmaxY p(Y |X,N) =
argmaxY p(N|X,Y )p(X|Y )p(Y ). The noise learning in
NoL (Algorithm 1) indicates an implicit generative mod-
eling behavior, that is constrained towards maximizing
p(N|X,Y ) while increasing the likelihood of the posterior
p(Y |X,N). We believe that this partial and implicit gen-
erative modeling perspective with posterior maximization,
during training, imparts an NoL model more knowledge
about the data manifold, rendering it less susceptible toward
adversarial attacks.
Intuitively, we can justify this robustness in two ways: First,
by integrating noise during training, we allow a model to
explore multiple directions within the vicinity of the data
point (thereby incorporating more off-manifold data) and
hence inculcate that knowledge in its underlying behav-
ior. Second, we note that noise learnt with NoL inherits
the input data characteristics (i.e. N ⊂ X) and that the
noise-modeling direction (∇NL) is aligned with the loss
gradient, ∇XL (that is also used to calculate the adversar-
ial inputs, Xadv = X + sign(∇XL)). This ensures that
the exploration direction coincides with certain adversar-
ial directions improving the model’s generalization capa-
bility in such spaces. Next, we empirically demonstrate
using PCA that, noise modeling indeed embraces some
off-manifold data points. Note, for fully guaranteed ad-
versarial robustness as per Eqn. 2, the joint input/output
distribution (p(X|Y ), p(Y )) has to be realized in addition
to the noise modeling and N should span the entire space
of adversarial/off-manifold data. We would like to clarify
that the above likelihood perspective is our intuition that
noise might be inculcating some sort of generaive behavior
in the discriminative classification. However, more rigorous
theoretical analysis is required to understand the underlying
behavior of noise.
2.3. PC Subspace Analysis for Variance &
Visualization
PCA serves as a method to reduce a complex dataset to
lower dimensions to reveal sometimes hidden, simplified
structure that often underlie it. Since the learned repre-
sentations of a deep learning model lie in a high dimen-
sional geometry of the data manifold, we opted to reduce
the dimensionality of the feature space and visualize the
relationship between the adversarial and clean inputs in this
reduced PC subspace. Essentially, we find the principal
components (or eigen-vectors) of the activations of an in-
termediate layer of a trained model and project the learnt
features onto the PC space. To do this, we center the learned
features about zero (F), factorize F using Singular Value
Decomposition (SVD), i.e. F = USV T and then transform
the feature samples F onto the new subspace by computing
FV = US ≡ FPC . In Fig. 3 (b), we visualize the learnt
representations of the Conv1 layer of a ResNet18 model
trained on CIFAR-10 (with standard SGD) along different
2D-projections of the PC subspace in response to adversar-
ial/clean input images. Interestingly, we see that the model’s
perception of both the adversarial and clean inputs along
high-rank PCs (say, PC1- PC10 that account for maximum
variance in the data) is alike. As we move toward lower-rank
dimensions, the adversarial and clean image representations
dissociate. This implies that adversarial images place strong
emphasis on PCs that account for little variance in the data.
While we note a similar trend with NoL (Fig. 3 (a)), the
dissociation occurs at latter PC dimensions compared to Fig.
3 (b). A noteworthy observation here is that, adversarial
examples lie in close vicinity of the clean inputs for both
NoL/SGD scenarios ascertaining former theories of (Gilmer
et al., 2018).
To quantify the dissociation of the adversarial and clean
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Initial Final with negative gradient
𝛁𝛁𝑵𝑵𝑳𝑳
X+N X*N (a) (b)
CIFAR10 Accuracy (in %) of ResNet18 target model for WB-FGSM attacks for 𝜀𝜀 =(8/16)/255 for different trainingscenarios with ExL.
Figure 2. For multiplicative and additive noise training scenarios- (a) -accuracy comparison of NoL with SGD (b) -RGB noise template
learnt with NoL on CIFAR10 data. In (b), a sample training image of a ‘car’ before and after training with noise is shown. Note, we used
the same hyperparameters (batch-size =64, η, ηnoise etc.) and same inital noise template across all scenarios during training. Noise shown
is the mean across 64 templates.2
projections in the PC subspace, we calculate the cosine dis-
tance (DPC = 1N
∑N
i=1 1 − F
PC
cleani
·FPCadvi
‖FPCcleani‖2‖FPCadvi‖2 ) between
them along different PC dimensions. Here, N represents the
total number of sample images used to perform PCA and
FPCclean(F
PC
adv ) denote the transformed learnt representations
corresponding to clean (adversarial) input, respectively. The
distance between the learnt representations (for the Conv1
layer of ResNet18 model from the above scenario) consis-
tently increases for latter PCs as shown in Fig. 4 (a). Inter-
estingly, the cosine distance between adversarial and clean
features measured for a model trained with NoL noise is
significantly lesser than a standard SGD trained model. This
indicates that noise enables the model to look in the vicinity
of the original data point and inculcate more adversarial data
into its underlying representation. Note, we consider projec-
tion across all former dimensions (say, PC0, PC1,...PC100)
to calculate the distance at a later dimension (say, PC100)
i.e.,DPC100 is calculated by taking the dot product between
two 100-dimensional vectors: FPCclean,FPCadv . Please note, in
the remainder of the paper, NoL noise denotes the prior or
noise learnt during the training procedure by minimizing
the loss of a neural network. As per Algorithm 1, we use
the same set of templates over each training minibatch that
ensures that the noise templates randomly initialized at the
beginning of training learn and evolve to model the input
characteristics (as illustrated in Fig. 1). Specifically, NoL
noise refers to the learnt noise templates N : {N1, ...Nk}
as shown in Algorithm 1.
To further understand the role of NoL noise in a model’s
behavior, we analyzed the variance captured in the Conv1
layer’s activations of the ResNet18 model (in response to
clean inputs) by different PCs, as illustrated Fig. 4 (b). If
si = {1, ...,M} are the singular values of the matrix S, the
variance along a particular dimension PCk is defined as:
V ark = 100× (
∑k
i=0 si
2/
∑M
i=0 si
2). V ark along differ-
ent PCs provides a good measure of how much a particular
dimension explains about the data. We observe that NoL
noise increases the variance along the high rank PCs, for
instance, the net variance obtained from PC0-PC100 with
NoL Noise (90%) is more than that of standard SGD (76%).
In fact, we observe a similar increase in variance in the
leading PC dimensions for other intermediate blocks learnt
activations of the ResNet18 model [See Appendix B]. We
can infer that the increase in variance along the high-rank
PCs is a consequence of inclusion of more data points dur-
ing the overall learning process. Conversely, we can also
interpret this as NoL noise embracing more off-manifold ad-
versarial points into the overall data manifold that eventually
determines the model’s behavior. It is worth mentioning that
the variance analysis of the model’s behavior in response to
adversarial inputs yields nearly identical results as Fig. 4
(b) [Appendix B].
Interestingly, the authors in (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017)
conducted PCA whitening of the raw image data for clean
and adversarial inputs and demonstrated that adversarial
image coefficients for later PCs have greater variance. Our
results from PC subspace analysis corroborates their ex-
periments and further enables us to peek into the model’s
behavior for adversarial attacks. Note, for all the PCA ex-
periments above, we used 700 random images sampled from
the CIFAR-10 test data, i.e. N = 700. In addition, we used
the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) method to create
BB adversaries with a step size of 8/255, from a different
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3. Relationship between the model’s understanding of adversarial and clean inputs in PC subspace when trained with (a) NoL (b)
SGD.
source model (ResNet18 trained with SGD).
3. Results
3.1. Attack Methods
Given a test image X , an attack model perturbs the image
to yield an adversarial image, Xadv = X + ∆, such that a
classifier f misclassifies Xadv. In this work, we consider
`∞ bounded adversaries studied in earlier works (Goodfel-
low et al., 2014; Trame`r et al., 2017a; Madry et al., 2017),
wherein the perturbation (‖∆‖∞ ≤ ) is regulated by some
parameter . Also, we study robustness against both BB/WB
attacks to gauge the effectiveness of our approach. For an
exhaustive assessment, we consider the same attack meth-
ods deployed in (Trame`r et al., 2017a; Madry et al., 2017):
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): This single-step at-
tack is a simple way to generate malicious perturbations
in the direction of the loss gradient ∇XL(X,Ytrue) as:
Xadv = X + sign(∇XL(X,Ytrue)).
Random Step FGSM (R-FGSM): (Trame`r et al.,
2017a) suggested to prepend single-step attacks with
a small random step to escape the non-smooth vicin-
ity of a data point that might degrade attacks based
on single-step gradient computation. For parame-
ters , α (α = /2), the attack is defined as:
Xadv = X + sign(∇XL(X,Ytrue)), where X = X +
αsign(N (0d, Id)).
Iterative FGSM (I-FGSM): This method iteratively ap-
plies FGSM k times with a step size of β ≥ /k and
projects each step perturbation to be bounded by . Fol-
lowing (Trame`r et al., 2017a), we use two-step iterative
FGSM attacks.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): Similar to I-FGSM,
this is a multi-step variant of FGSM: Xadvt+1 =∏
(Xadv
t+αsign(∇XL(X,Ytrue))) . (Madry et al., 2017)
show that this is a universal first-order adversary created by
initializing the search for an adversary at a random point
followed by several iterations of FGSM. PGD attacks, till
date, are one of the strongest BB/ WB adversaries.
3.2. Experiments
We evaluated NoL on three datasets: MNIST, CIFAR10
and CIFAR100. For each dataset, we report the accuracy
of the models against BB/WB attacks (crafted from the test
data) for 6 training scenarios: a) Standard SGD (without
noise), b) NoL, c) Ensemble Adversarial (EnsAdv) Train-
ing (SGDens), d) NoL with EnsAdv Training (NoLens),
e) PGD Adversarial (PGDAdv) Training (SGDPGD), f)
NoL with PGDAdv Training (NoLPGD). Note, SGDens
and SGDPGD refer to the standard adversarial training em-
ployed in (Trame`r et al., 2017a) and (Madry et al., 2017),
respectively. Our results compare how the additional noise
modeling improves over standard SGD in adversarial sus-
ceptibility. Also, we integrate NoL with state-of-the-art
PGD/Ensemble adversarial training techniques to analyze
how noise modeling benefits them. In case of EnsAdv train-
ing, we augmented the training dataset of the target model
with adversarial examples (generated using FGSM), from
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(a) (b)
Figure 4. (a) Cosine Distance between the model’s response to clean and adversarial inputs in the PC subspace. (b) Variance of the Conv1
layer of ResNet18 model. (a), (b) compare the SGD/ NoL training scenarios.
an independently trained model, with same architecture as
the target model. In case of PGDAdv training, we aug-
mented the training dataset of the target model with adver-
sarial examples (generated using PGD) from the same target
model. Thus, as we see later, EnsAdv imparts robustness
against BB attacks only, while, PGD makes a model robust
to both BB/WB attacks. In all experiments below, we re-
port the WB/BB accuracy against strong adversaries created
with PGD attack. In additon, for BB, we also report the
worst-case error over all small-step attacks FGSM, I-FGSM,
R-FGSM, denoted as Min BB in Table 1, 2.
Note, NoL scenario refers to our proposed approach (or
Algorithm 1) wherein we introduce multiplicative noise at
the beginning of training and eventually learn the noise
while minimizing the loss for model parameters. NoLens
refers to the scenario wherein we combine EnsAdv training
with NoL (or Algorithm 1 with EnsAdv training). That is,
a model is trained with adversarial data augmentation and
also has multiplicative noise that is eventually learnt during
the training procedure. In this case, since we show both
clean and FGSM-based BB adversarial input data during
training, we can expect that the learnt noise will model
both clean/BB-adversarial input distribution. NoLPGD
refers to the scenario where PGDAdv training is combined
with NoL (or Algorithm 1 with PGDAdv training). Here,
we perform the prior noise modeling (with multiplicative
noise injected at the beginning of training) while training
a network with both clean and PGD-based WB adversar-
ial data. We can expect the learnt noise to model both
clean/WB-adversarial input distribution in this case. As we
will see later, NoLens, NoLPGD will serve as good indi-
cators of how integrating the prior noise learning approach
with the adversarial defense methods, SGDens, SGDPGD,
improves their ability to defend against a larger range of
perturbations/attacks.
All networks were trained with mini-batch SGD using a
batch size of 64 and momentum of 0.9 (0.5) for CIFAR
(MNIST), respectively. For CIFAR10, CIFAR100 we used
additional weight decay regularization, λ = 5e− 4. Note,
for noise modeling, we simply used the negative loss gradi-
ents (∇NL ≤ 0) without additional optimization terms. In
general, NoL requires slightly more epochs of training to
converge to similar accuracy as standard SGD, a result of
the additional input noise modeling. Also, NoL models, if
not tuned with proper learning rate, have a tendency to over-
fit. Hence, the learning rate for noise (ηnoise) was kept 1-2
orders of magnitude lesser than the overall network learning
rate (η) throughout the training process. All networks were
implemented in PyTorch.3
MNIST: For MNIST, we consider a simple network with 2
Convolutional (C) layers with 32, 64 filters, each followed
by 2×2 Max-pooling (M), and finally a Fully-Connected
(FC) layer of size 1024, as the target model (ConvNet1:
32C-M-64C-M-1024FC). We trained 6 ConvNet1 mod-
els independently corresponding to the different scenar-
ios. The EnsAdv (NoLens, SGDens) models were trained
with BB adversaries created from a separate SGD-trained
ConvNet1 model using FGSM with  = 0.1. PGDAdv
(NoLPGD, SGDPGD) models were trained with WB ad-
versaries created from the same target model using PGD
with  = 0.3, step-size = 0.01 over 40 steps.
Table 1 (Columns 3 - 5) illustrates our results for BB attacks
under different perturbations ()4. NoL noise considerably
3Appendix C provides a detailed table of different hyperparam-
eters used to train the source and target models in each scenario
corresponding to all experiments of Table 1, 2 . Appendix C shows
different visualization of noise learnt (N ) in each scenario of Table
1, 2.
4For fair comparison, BB attacks on
SGD,NoL, SGDens, NoLens were crafted from another model
trained with standard SGD on natural examples as in (Trame`r
et al., 2017a). While, BB attacks on SGDPGD, NoLPGD were
crafted from a model trained with PGDAdv training (without noise
modeling) on adversarial examples as in (Madry et al., 2017) to
cast stronger attacks.
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Table 1. MNIST Accuracy (in %) of ConvNet1 target model for different scenarios.  = 0.1/0.2/0.3 for
SGD,NoL, SGDens, NoLens;  = 0.3/0.4 for SGDPGD, NoLPGD . For PGD attack, we report accuracy for 40-/100-step at-
tacks. Accuracy < 5%, in most places, have been omitted and marked as ‘-’.
Scenario Clean Min BB PGD-40 PGD-100 PGD-40 PGD-100
(———————BlackBox—————) (—–WhiteBox—–)
SGD 99.1 77.9/20.6/4.3 75/9.9/- 74.5/8/- 22.3/-/- -
NoL 99.2 83.6/30.5/9.6 80.5/20.6/- 80/18/- 29.4/-/- -
SGDens 99 98.5/92.6/73.2 98/89.3/71 98.1/88/57 2.1/-/- -
NoLens 99.1 99/94.7/76 98.8/93.4/79 98.7/91.9/66 3.3/-/- -
SGDPGD 97.9 91.8/29 93.6/48.7 92.3/20 90/27 86.5/4.5
NoLPGD 98 93/42.2 94/60.4 92.6/28.7 90.7/55.7 88/20.1
improves the robustness of a model toward BB attacks com-
pared to standard SGD. Without adversarial training, stan-
dard SGD and NoL suffer a drastic accuracy decline for
 > 0.1. With EnsAdv training, the robustness improves
across all  for both SGDens, NoLens. However, the ro-
bustness is significantly accentuated in NoLens owing to
the additional noise modeling performed during EnsAdv
training. An interesting observation here is that for  = 0.1
(that was the perturbation size for EnsAdv training), both
NoLens/SGDens yield nearly similar accuracy, ∼ 98%.
However, for larger perturbation size  = 0.2, 0.3, the net-
work adversarially trained with NoL noise shows higher
prediction capability (∼> 5%) across the PGD attack meth-
ods. Columns 6-7 in Table 1 show the WB attack results.
All techniques except for the ones with PGDAdv training
fail miserably against the strong WB PGD attacks. Models
trained with NoL noise, although yielding low accuracy,
still perform better than SGD. NoLPGD yields better ac-
curacy than SGDPGDeven beyond what the network is
adversarially trained for ( > 0.3). Note, for PGD attack
in Table 1, we used a step-size of 0.01 over 40/100 steps to
create adversaries bounded by  = 0.1/0.2/0.3. We also
evaluated the worst-case accuracy over all the BB attack
methods when the source model is trained with NoL noise
(not shown). We found higher accuracies in this case, im-
plying NoL models transfer attacks at lower rates. As a
result, in the remainder of the paper, we conduct BB attacks
from models trained without noise modeling to evaluate the
adversarial robustness.
CIFAR: For CIFAR10, we examined our approach on the
ResNet18 architecture. We used the ResNext29(2×64d)
architecture (Xie et al., 2017) with bottleneck width 64, car-
dinality 2 for CIFAR100. Similar to MNIST, we trained
the target models separately corresponding to each sce-
nario and crafted BB/WB attacks. For EnsAdv training,
we used BB adversaries created using FGSM ( = 8/255)
from a separate SGD-trained network different from the
BB source/target model. For PGDAdv training, the target
models were trained with WB adversaries created with PGD
with  = 8/255, step-size=2/255 over 7 steps. Here, for
PGD attacks, we use 7/20 steps of size 2/255 bounded by .
The results appear in Table 2.
For BB, we observe that NoL (81%/63.2% for CI-
FAR10/100) significantly boosts the robustness of a model
as compared to SGD (50.3%/44.2% for CIFAR10/100).
Note, the improvement here is quite large in comparison to
MNIST (that shows only 5% increase from SGD to NoL).
In fact, the accuracy obtained with NoL alone with BB
attack, is almost comparable to that of an EnsAdv/PGDAdv
trained model without noise (SGDens, SGDPGD). The
richness of the data manifold and feature representation
space for larger models and complex datasets allows NoL to
model better characteristics in the noise causing increased
robustness. As seen earlier, NoL noise (NoLens, NoLPGD)
considerably improves the accuracy even for perturbations
( = (16, 32)/255) greater than what the network is ad-
versarially trained for. The increased susceptibility of
SGDens, SGDPGD for larger  establishes that its capabil-
ity is limited by the diversity of adversarial examples shown
during training. For WB attacks as well, NoLPGD show
higher resistance. Interestingly, while SGD,SGDens yield
infinitesimal performance (< 5%), NoL,NoLens yield rea-
sonably higher accuracy (> 25%) against WB attacks. This
further establishes the potential of noise modeling in en-
abling adversarial security. It is worth mentioning that
BB accuracy of SGDPGD, NoLPGD models in Table 1,
2 are lower than SGDens, NoLens, since the former is at-
tacked with stronger attacks crafted from models trained
with PGDAdv4. Attacking the former with similar adver-
saries as latter yields higher accuracy.
PC Distance & Variance Analysis : Next, we measured
the variance and cosine distance captured by the Conv1
layer of the ResNet18 model corresponding to different
scenarios (Table 2). Fig. 5 shows that variance across
the leading PCs decreases as NoLPGD > SGDPGD >
NoLens > NoL > SGDens > SGD. Inclusion of adver-
sarial data points with adversarial training or noise modeling
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Table 2. CIFAR10/ CIFAR100 Accuracy (in %) of ResNet18/ ResNext-29 target model for different scenarios.  = 8
255
/ 16
255
/ 32
255
for NoL, SGD,NoLens, SGDens, NoLPGD, SGDPGD . For PGD attack, we report accuracy for 7-/20-step attacks. Accuracy < 5%,
in most places, have been omitted and marked as ‘-’.
Scenario Clean Min BB PGD-7 PGD-20 PGD-7 PGD-20
(———————BlackBox—————) (———WhiteBox——–)
ResNet18 (CIFAR10)
SGD 88.8 50.3/32/16.2 16.2/15/11.8 7.5/6.2/- - -
NoL 87.1 81/76/67 72.6/71.6/69.1 37/36.1/33.2 8.8/8.2/7.1 -
SGDens 86.3 81.3/76.6/68.3 80.9/75.1/67.1 80.2/74.4/63 0.8/-/- -
NoLens 86.4 84.4/81.4/72.6 83/80/71.3 82.7/79/71 29/21/16.5 -
SGDPGD 83.2 71.3/58/50 69.9/62/50.1 54.2/50.3/46 58.4/48/42 57.3/42.8/28
NoLPGD 83 73/62/56.8 71/65/53 57.6/53.7/49.8 63/59/57 59.2/45/30.1
ResNext29 (CIFAR100)
SGD 71 44.2/38.4/26.7 42.7/35/25.4 40.5/27/17 - -
NoL 69.4 63.2/58.5/50.1 62.9/54.3/48.4 62.3/53.1/42.5 19/14/10.3 -
SGDens 69.8 64.8/60.9/50 63.6/57.5/45.4 63/56/42 2.5/-/- -
NoLens 67.3 65.1/62.8/57 64.8/61.4/52.2 64.4/58/49 18/14/11 -
SGDPGD 71.6 57.5/48/38.4 56/45/41.3 48/40/38.4 51.5/49.8/46 50.4/43/33
NoLPGD 69 66.3/62/59.9 63/58.7/54.1 52.3/50/40.8 58.1/56/53 53/48/37.9
informs a model more, leading to improved variance. We
note that NoLens and SGDPGD yield nearly similar vari-
ance ratio, although SGDPGD gives better accuracy than
NoLens for similar BB and WB attacks. Since we are ana-
lyzing only the Conv1 layer, we get this discrepancy. In Fig.
5, we also plot the cosine distance between the adversarial
(created from FGSM with specified ) and clean inputs in
the PC subspace. The distance across different scenarios
along latter PCs increases as: NoLPGD < SGDPGD <
NoLens < NoL < SGDens < SGD. A noteworthy
observation here is, PC distance follows the same order
as decreasing variance and justifies the accuracy results in
Table 2. The decreasing distance with NoL compared to
SGD further signifies improved realization of the on-/off-
manifold data. Also, the fact that NoLPGD, NoLens have
lower distance for varying  establishes that integrating noise
modeling with adversarial training compounds adversarial
robustness. Interestingly, for both variance and PC distance,
NoL has a better characteristic than SGDens. This proves
that noise modeling enables implicit inclusion of adversarial
data without direct data augmentation, as opposed to En-
sAdv training (or SGDens) where the dataset is explicitly
augmented. This also explains the comparable BB accuracy
between NoL, SGDens in Table 2.
Adversarial Subspace Dimensionality : To further
corroborate that NoL noise implicitly embraces adversarial
points, we evaluated the adversarial subspace dimension
using the Gradient-Aligned Adversarial Subspace (GAAS)
method of (Trame`r et al., 2017b). We construct k orthogonal
vectors r1, .., rk ∈ {−1, 1} from a regular Hadamard matrix
of order k ∈ {22, 23, .., 27}. We then multiply each ri
component-wise with the gradient, sign(∇XL(X,Ytrue)).
Hence, estimating the dimensionality reduces to finding a
set of orthogonal perturbations, ri with ‖ri‖∞ =  in the
vicinity of a data point that causes misclassification. For
each scenario of Table 2 (CIFAR10), we select 350 random
test points, x, and plot the probability that we find at least
k orthogonal vectors ri such that x + ri is misclassified.
Fig. 6 (a), (b) shows the results with varying  for BB, WB
instances. We find that the size of the space of adversarial
samples is much lower for a model trained with NoL
noise than that of standard SGD. For  = 8/255, we find
over 128/64 directions for ∼ 25%/15% of the points in
case of SGD/NoL. With EnsAdv training, the number
of adversarial directions for SGDens/NoLens reduces
to 64 that misclassifies ∼ 17/15% of the points. With
PGDAdv training, the adversarial dimension significantly
reduces in case of NoLPGD for both BB/WB. As we
increase the perturbation size ( = 32/255), we observe
increasingly reduced number of misclassified points as well
as adversarial dimensions for models trained with noise
modeling. The WB adversarial plot, in Fig. 6 (b), clearly
shows the reduced space obtained with noise modeling
with PGDAdv training (NoLPGD) against plain PGDAdv
(SGDPGD) for  = (8, 32)/255.
Loss Surface Smoothening: By now, it is clear that while
NoL alone can defend against BB attacks (as compared
to SGD) reasonably well, it still remains vulnerable to
WB attacks. For WB defense and to further improve
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ϵ =8/255 ϵ =32/255
Figure 5. [Left] Variance (in response to clean inputs) across different scenarios for the first 700 PC dimensions. [Middle, Right]
Cosine distance across 700 PCs between clean and adversarial representations for varying . SGDens, SGDPGD exhibit improved
variance (and lower distance) than SGD, suggesting PC variance/ distance as a good indicator of adversarial robustness. PCA
was conducted with sample of 700 test images.
ϵ =8/255 ϵ =32/255
(b)(a)
Figure 6. Adversarial subspace dimensionality for varying  for- (a) -BB adversaries crafted from a model trained with natural examples
(b) -WB adversaries crafted for models trained with PGDAdv training.
BB defense, we need to combine NoL noise modeling
with adversarial training. To further investigate this, we
plotted the loss surface of MNIST models on examples
x = x + 1 · gBB + 2 · gWB in Fig. 7, where gBB is
the signed gradient, sign(∇XL(X,Ytrue)source), obtained
from the source model (crafting the BB attacks) and gWB is
the gradient obtained from the target model itself (crafting
WB attacks), sign(∇XL(X,Ytrue)target). We see that the
loss surface in case of SGD is highly curved with steep
slopes in the vicinity of the data point in both BB and WB
direction. The EnsAdv training, SGDens, smoothens out
the slope in the BB direction substantially, justifying their
robustness against BB attacks. Models trained with noise
modeling,NoL (even without any data augmentation), yield
a softer loss surface. This is why NoL models transfer BB
attacks at lower rates. The surface in the WB direction along
2 with NoL,NoLens still exhibits a sharper curvature (al-
though slightly softer than SGDens) validating the lower
accuracies against WB attacks (compared to BB attacks).
PGDAdv, on the other hand, smoothens out the loss surface
substantially in both directions owing to the explicit inclu-
sion of WB adversaries during training. Note, NoLPGD
yields a slightly softer surface than SGDPGD (not shown).
The smoothening effect of noise modeling further justifies
the boosted robustness of NoL models for larger perturba-
tions (outside -ball used during adversarial training). It
is worth mentioning that we get similar PCA/ Adversarial
dimensionality/ loss surface results across all datasets.
SGD SGDens
Data Point, x
NoL NoLens NoLPGD
Figure 7. Loss surface of models corresponding to MNIST (Ta-
ble1).
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4. Discussion
We proposed Noise-based Prior Learning, NoL, as a reliable
method for improving adversarial robustness. Specifically,
our key findings are:
1) We show that noise modeling at the input during dis-
criminative training improves a model’s ability to generalize
better for out-of-sample adversarial data (without explicit
data augmentation).
2) Our PCA variance and cosine distance analysis pro-
vides a significant perspective to visualize and quantify a
model’s response to adversarial/clean data.
A crucial question one can ask is, How to break NoL de-
fense? The recent work (Athalye et al., 2018) shows that
many defense methods cause ‘gradient masking’ that eventu-
ally fail. We reiterate that, NoL alone does not give a strong
BB/WB defense. However, the smoothening effect of noise
modeling on the loss (Fig. 7) suggests that noise modeling
decreases the magnitude of the gradient masking effect. NoL
does not change the classification model that makes it easy
to be scaled to larger datasets while integrating with other
adversarial defense techniques. Coupled with other defense,
NoL performs remarkably (even for larger  values). We
combine NoL with EnsAdv & PGDAdv, which do not cause
obfuscated gradients and hence can withstand strong attacks,
however, upto a certain point. For WB perturbations much
greater than the training  value, NoL+PGDAdv also breaks.
In fact, for adaptive BB adversaries (Trame`r et al., 2017a)
or adversaries that query the model to yield full prediction
confidence (not just the label), NoL+EnsAdv will be vulner-
able. Note, advantage with NoL is, being independent of the
attack/defense method, NoL can be potentially combined
with stronger attacks developed in future, to create stronger
defenses.
While variance and principal subspace analysis help us un-
derstand a model’s behavior, we cannot fully describe the
structure of the manifold learnt by the linear subspace view.
However, PCA does provide a basic intuition about the gen-
eralization capability of complex image models. In fact,
our PC results establish the superiority of PGDAdv training
((Madry et al., 2017) best defense so far), in general, as a
strong defense method and can be used as a valid metric to
gauge adversarial susceptibility in future proposals. Finally,
as our likelihood theory indicates, better noise modeling
techniques with improved gradient penalties can further im-
prove robustness and requires further investigation. Also,
performing noise modeling at intermediate layers to im-
prove variance, and hence robustness, are other future work
directions.
A final note on novelty of NoL. As noted earlier, there have
been past works (Noh et al., 2017; Fawzi et al., 2016; Hin-
ton) where the training dataset is perturbed with random
noise, and the perturbed images are then used to train a deep
neural network. The role of such noise is to impose better
regularization effect (or reduce overfitting) during training
which, in turn, improves a models generalization capabil-
ity or inference accuracy (Hinton). It is worth mentioning
that such methods do not result in adversarial robustness
(also, verified in (Goodfellow et al., 2014)). In the proposed
NoL approach, the input noise (randomly initialized at the
beginning of training) is gradually learnt during the train-
ing procedure. The fact that we train the noise (or prior)
is the major distinguishing factor between our approach
and previous works (Noh et al., 2017; Fawzi et al., 2016;
Hinton) that simply perturb the training data with random
noise. The implicit prior modeling property of NoL goes
beyond simple regularization and in fact, results in adversar-
ial robustness (wherein, a model’s ability to generalize on
adversarial data improves). Our PC distance and variance
analysis (in Section 2.3, 3.2) further attest the capability of
the learnt noise (or prior) to embrace adversarial points into
the data manifold thereby improving a model’s adversarial
accuracy. In fact, our results in Table 2 show that standalone
NoL achieves better white-box accuracy than the ensemble
adversarial training defense approach SGDens. This im-
plies that even some white-box perturbations are inherited
in this implicit noise modeling procedure. Such adversarial
robustness cannot be attained with a setup of training over
randomly perturbed examples as (Noh et al., 2017; Fawzi
et al., 2016). Finally, we would also like to point out that our
noise-based prior learning can possibly render some regular-
ization effects on a model during training. The smoothened
loss curves in Fig. 7 observed with NoL in comparison to
SGD verifies the regularized model behavior.
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A. Appendix A: Justification of X +N vs
X ×N and use of∇LN ≤ 0 for noise
modeling
Figure A1. For MNIST dataset, we show the noise template learnt
when we use multiplicative/additive noise (N ) for Noise-based
Prior Learning. The final noise-integrated image (for a sample digit
‘9’) that is fed to the network before and after training is also shown.
Additive noise disrupts the image drastically. Multiplicative noise,
on the other hand, enhances the relevant pixels while eliminating
the background. Accuracy corrsponding to each scenario is also
shown and compared against standard SGD training scenario (with-
out any noise). Here, we train a simple convolutional architecture
(ConvNet: 10C-M-20C-M-320FC) of 2 Convolutional (C) layers
with 10, 20 filters, each followed by 2×2 Max-pooling (M) and
a Fully-Connected (FC) layer of size 320. We use mini-batch
SGD with momentum of 0.5, learning rate (η=0.1) decayed by 0.1
every 15 epochs and batch-size 64 to learn the network parameters.
We trained 3 ConvNet models independently corresponding to
each scenario for 30 epochs. For the NoL scenarios, we conduct
noise modelling with only negative loss gradients (∇LN ≤ 0)
with noise learning rate, ηnoise = 0.001, throughout the training
process. Note, the noise image shown is the average across all 64
noise templates.
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Figure A2. Here, we showcase the noise learnt by a simple con-
volutional network (ConvNet: 10C-M-20C-M-320FC), learning
the CIFAR10 data with NoL (multiplicative noise) under differ-
ent gradient update conditions. As with MNIST (Fig. A1), we
observe that the noise learnt enhances the region of interest while
deemphasizing the background pixels. Note, the noise in this case
has RGB components as a result of which we see some prominent
color blobs in the noise template after training. The performance
table shows that using only negative gradients (i.e. ∇LN ≤ 0)
during backpropagation for noise modelling yields minimal loss
in accuracy as compared to a standard SGD trained model. We
use mini-batch SGD with momentum of 0.9, weight decay 5e-
4, learning rate (η=0.01) decayed by 0.2 every 10 epochs and
batch-size 64 to learn the network parameters. We trained 4 Con-
vNet models independently corresponding to each scenario for 30
epochs. For the NoL scenarios, we conduct noise modelling by
backpropagating the corresponding gradient with noise learning
rate (ηnoise = 0.001) throughout the training process. Note, the
noise image shown is the average across all 64 noise templates.
B. Appendix B: PC variance for SGD and
NoL scenarios in response to adversarial
and clean inputs across different layers of
ResNet18
Figure A3. Here, we show the variance captured in the leading
Principal Component (PC) dimensions for the inital convolutional
layer’s (Conv1) and intermediate blocks learnt activations of a
ResNet-18 model trained on CIFAR10 data. We compare the
variance of the learnt representations (in response to clean inputs)
for each block across two scenarios: SGD (without noise) and
NoL (with noise). Note, we capture the variance of the final
block’s activations before average pooling. That is, the activations
of Block4 have dimension 512 × 4 × 4. We observe that NoL
noise increases the variance along the high rank PCs. Also, as
we go deeper into the network, the absolute difference of the
variance values between SGD/NoL decreases. This is expected
as the contribution of input noise on the overall representations
decreases as we go deeper into the network. Moreover, there is
a generic-to-specific transition in the hierarchy of learnt features
of a deep neural network. Thus, the linear PC subspace analysis
to quantify a model’s knowledge of the data manifold is more
applicable in the earlier layers, since they learn more general input-
related characteristics. Nonetheless, we see that NoL model yields
widened variance than SGD for each intermediate layer except
the final Block4 that feeds into the output layer. We use mini-
batch SGD with momentum of 0.9, weight decay 5e-4, learning
rate (η=0.1) decayed by 0.1 every 30 epochs and batch-size 64
to learn the network parameters. We trained 2 ResNet-18 models
independently corresponding to each scenario for 60 epochs. For
noise modelling, we use ηnoise = 0.001 decayed by 0.1 every 30
epochs. Note, we used a sample set of 700 test images to conduct
the PCA.
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Figure A4. Here, we show the variance captured in the leading
Principal Component (PC) dimensions for the Conv1 and Block1
learnt activations in response to both clean and adversarial inputs
for ResNet-18 models correponding to the scenarios discussed
in Fig. A3. The model’s variance for both clean and adversarial
inputs are exactly same in case of NoL/SGD for Conv1 layers.
For Block1, the adversarial input variance is slighlty lower in
case of SGD than that of clean input. With NoL, the variance is
still the same for Block1. This indicates that PC variance statis-
tics cannot differentiate between a model’s knowledge of on-/off-
manifold data. It only tells us whether a model’s underlying repre-
sentation has acquired more knowledge about the data manifold.
To analyze a model’s understanding of adversarial data, we need
to look into the relationship between the clean and adversarial
projection onto the PC subspace and measure the cosine distance.
Note, we used the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) method
(Goodfellow et al., 2014) to create BB adversaries with a step size
of 8/255, from another independently trained ResNet-18 model
(source) with standard SGD. The source attack model has the
same hyperparameters as the SGD model in Fig. A3 and is trained
for 40 epochs.
C. Appendix C: Experimental Details and
Model Description
Figure A5. Here, we show the noise templates learnt with noise
modeling corresponding to different training scenarios of Table
1, 2 in main paper: NoL (only noise modeling), NoL PGD (noise
modeling with PGDAdv trainingNoLPGD), NoL ens (noise mod-
eling with EnsAdv training NoLens) for MNIST and CIFAR10
data. A sample image (X × N ) before and after training with
different scenarios is shown. The fact that every training tech-
nique yields different noise template shows that noise influences
the overall optimization. Column 1 shows the noise template and
correponding image (X ×N ) before training, Coulmns 2-4 show
the templates after training. Note, noise shown is the mean across
64 templates.
The Pytorch implementation of ResNet-18 architecture for
CIFAR10 and ResNext-29 architecture for CIFAR100 were
taken from (Github). For CIFAR10/CIFAR100, we use
mini-batch SGD with momentum of 0.9, weight decay 5e-
4 and batch size 64 for training the weight parameters of
the models. A detailed description of the learning rate and
epochs for ResNet18 model (corresponding to Table 2 in
main paper) is shown in Table A1. Similarly, Table A2
shows the parameters for ResNext-29 model. The hyper-
parmeters corresponding to each scenario (of Table A1, A2)
are shown in Rows1-6 under Target type. The hyperparam-
eters for the source model used to attack the target models
for BB scenarios is shown in Row 7/8 under Source type.
We use BB attacks from the SGD trained source model
to attack SGD,NoL,NoLens, PGDens. We use BB at-
tacks from a model trained with PGD adversarial training
( = 8/255, step-size=2/255 over 7 steps) to craft strong BB
attacks on SGDPGD, NoLPGD. The model used to gen-
erate black box adversaries to augment the training dataset
of the SGDens, NoLens target models is shown in Row 9
under EnsAdv type.
How to conduct Ensemble Adversarial Training? Fur-
thermore, in all our experiments, for EnsAdv training
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(SGDens), we use a slightly different approach than (Ku-
rakin et al., 2016). Instead of using a weighted loss function
that controls the relative weight of adversarial/clean exam-
ples in the overall loss computation, we use a different
learning rate ηadv/η (ηadv < η) when training with adver-
sarial/clean inputs, respectively, to learn the network param-
eters. Accordingly, while performing adversarial training
with noise-based learning (NoLens), the noise modeling
learning rate in addition to overall learning rate, ηadv/η, for
adversarial/clean inputs is also different, ηnoiseadv/ηnoise
(ηnoiseadv < ηnoise).
How to conduct PGD Adversarial Training? For PGD
adversarial training (SGDPGD), we used the techniques
suggested in (Kannan et al., 2018). (Kannan et al., 2018)
propose that training on a mixture of clean and adversarial
examples (generated using PGD attack), instead of literally
solving the min-max problem described by (Madry et al.,
2017) yields better performance. In fact, this helps maintain
good accuracy on both clean and adversarial examples. Like
EnsAdv training, here as well, we use a different learning
rate ηadv/η (ηadv < η) when training with adversarial/clean
inputs, respectively, to learn the network parameters. Ac-
cordingly, while performing PGD adversarial training with
noise-based learning (NoLPGD), the noise modeling learn-
ing rate in addition to overall learning rate, ηadv/η, for
adversarial/clean inputs is also different, ηnoiseadv/ηnoise
(ηnoiseadv < ηnoise)
Note, the adversarial inputs for EnsAdv training of a target
model are created using BB adversaries generated by stan-
dard FGSM from a source (shown in Row 9 of Table A1,
A2), while PGDAdv training uses WB adversaries created
with PGD attack from the same target model. We also show
the test accuracy (on clean data) for each model in Table
A1,A2 for reference. Note, the learning rate in each case
decays by a factor of 0.1 every 20/30 epochs (Column 5 in
Table A1, A2).
Table A1. Hyperparameter Table for training ResNet18 mod-
els on CIFAR10 data
Model Type Training
Method
Epochs η/ηadv η, ηadv
decay/step-
size
ηnoise/ηnoiseadv ηnoise, ηnoiseadv
decay/step-
size
Test
Accuracy in
(%)
Target
SGD 120 0.1/– 0.1/30 – – 88.8
NoL 120 0.1/– 0.1/30 0.001/– 0.1/30 87.1
SGDens 80 0.1/0.05 0.1/30 – – 86.3
NoLens 120 0.1/0.05 0.1/30 0.001/0.0005 0.1/30 86.4
SGDPGD 122 0.1/0.1 0.1/20 – – 83.2
NoLPGD 122 0.1/0.1 0.1/20 0.001/0.0005 0.1/20 83
Source SGD 300 0.1/– 0.1/100 – – 89
PGDAdv 122 0.1/0.1 0.1/20 – – 83
EnsAdv SGD 31 0.1/– 0.1/30 – – 81
For MNIST, we use 2 different architectures as source/ target
models. ConvNet1: 32C-M-64C-M-1024FC is the model
used as target. ConvNet2: 10C-M-20C-M-320FC is the
model used as source. Here, we use mini-batch SGD with
Table A2. Hyperparameter Table for training ResNext29 mod-
els on CIFAR100 data
Model Type Training
Method
Epochs η/ηadv η, ηadv
decay/step-
size
ηnoise/ηnoiseadv ηnoise, ηnoiseadv
decay/step-
size
Test
Accuracy in
(%)
Target
SGD 100 0.1/– 0.1/40 – – 71
NoL 58 0.1/– 0.1/20 0.001/– 0.1/20 69.4
SGDens 42 0.1/0.05 0.1/20 – – 69.8
NoLens 48 0.1/0.05 0.1/20 0.001/0.0005 0.1/20 67.3
SGDPGD 52 0.1/0.05 0.1/20 – – 71.6
NoLPGD 52 0.1/0.05 0.1/20 0.001/0.0005 0.1/20 69
Source SGD 34 0.1/– 0.1/10 – – 67.2
PGDAdv 48 0.1/0.05 0.1/20 – – 68.4
EnsAdv SGD 45 0.1/– 0.1/20 – – 71.3
Table A3. Hyperparameter Table for training Con-
vNet1/ConvNet2 models on MNIST data
Model Type Training
Method
Epochs η/ηadv η, ηadv
decay/step-
size
ηnoise/ηnoiseadv ηnoise, ηnoiseadv
decay/step-
size
Test
Accuracy in
(%)
Target
ConvNet1
SGD 100 0.01/– 0.1/50 – – 99.1
NoL 150 0.01/– 0.1/50 0.001/– 0.1/50 99.2
SGDens 64 0.01/0.005 0.1/30 – – 99
NoLens 32 0.01/0.005 0.1/30 0.001/3.3e-5 0.1/30 99.1
SGDPGD 142 0.01/0.01 0.1/30 – – 97.9
NoLPGD 162 0.01/0.01 0.1/30 1e-4/1e-5 0.1/30 98
Source
(ConvNet2)
SGD 15 0.01/– –/– – – 98.6
PGDAdv 128 0.01/0.01 0.1/30 – – 97
EnsAdv
ConvNet1
SGD 15 0.01/– –/– – – 98.8
momentum of 0.5, batch size 64, for training the weight
parameters. Table A3 shows the hyperparameters used
to train the models in Table 1 of main paper. The nota-
tions here are similar to that of Table A1. Note, the source
model trained with PGDAdv training to craft BB attacks
on NoLPGD, SGDPGD was trained with  = 0.3, step-
size=0.01 over 40 steps.
C.1. Model Description for Fig. 2 in Main Paper
Table A4. Hyperparameter Table for training ResNet18 mod-
els on CIFAR10 data for different types of noise modeling
(X +N,X ×N ) with all/ only negative gradient∇LN
Noise
Modeling
Type
Gradient
∇LN
Epochs η η
decay/step-
size
ηnoise ηnoise
decay/step-
size
Test
Accuracy in
(%)
X +N Negative 120 0.1 0.1/30 0.001 0.1/30 78.1
X +N All 120 0.1 0.1/30 0.001 0.1/30 77.1
X ×N Negative 120 0.1 0.1/30 0.001 0.1/30 87.1
X ×N All 120 0.1 0.1/30 0.001 0.1/30 85.1
SGD - 120 0.1 0.1/30 - - 88.9
We use mini-batch SGD with momentum of 0.9, weight de-
cay 5e-4 and batch size 64 for training the weight parameters
of the models in Table A4.
